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ABSTRACT  
 
Using theory and empirical data from social psychology to measure for cultural differences 
between countries, we study the effect of individualism as defined by Hofstede (1980) and 
egalitarianism as defined by Schwartz (1994, 1999, 2004) on earnings management. We find 
a significant influence of both cultural measures. In line with Licht et al. (2004), who argue 
that individualistic societies may be less susceptible to corruption, we find that countries 
scoring high on individualism tend to have lower levels of earnings management. In addition, 
we find that egalitarianism, defined as a society's cultural orientation with respect to 
intolerance for abuses of market and political power, is negatively related with earnings 
management. Our results are robust to different specifications and controls. The main 
message of this paper is that besides formal institutions, cultural differences are relevant to 
explain earnings management behaviour. We think that our work adds to the understanding of 
the importance of cultural values in managerial behaviour across countries contributing to the 
literature on earnings management and law and institutions. 
 
Keywords: Culture, Earnings Management, Informal Institutions, quality of financial 
information, Individualism, Egalitarianism 
JEL Classifications: G32, G34, K22, K4, Z13 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
National culture has long been recognized as important in explaining behaviour. Aspects of 
national culture have been related to many areas of organizational behaviour, such as foreign 
investment decisions (Tahir and Larimo, 2004), entry mode decisions (Arora and Fosturi, 
2000) and research and development decisions (Muralidharan and Phatak, 1999) and 
negotiation behaviour (Leung, 1988). However, determining the influence of culture on 
behaviour is not easy, as culture is a complex and broad construct that is difficult to 
accurately measure. 
 
Theorists, policy-makers, and practitioners share the intuition that corporate governance 
reflects national culture (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). Shleifer (2002) posited that the practice of 
justice and the ‘structure’ of society rather than the law itself are what matters for investor 
protection – that legal rules are just a reflection of a broader societal stance. Until recently, 
however, commentators treated culture either anecdotally or as a black box. The challenge for 
economic analysis is to operationalize culture in ways that permit developing and 
investigating testable hypotheses (Siegel et al., 2006). The paucity of studies on the 
determinants of culture and its economic consequences has occurred in part because of the 
belief that culture does not matter or because of the belief that culture cannot be suitably 
decomposed and measured (Guiso et al. 2005). Recent studies, (e.g. Stulz and Williamson, 
2003 and Beck et al., 2003) use countries’ predominant religion as a proxy for their national 
culture. Religion is a convenient proxy for culture. Classifying countries by religion, 
however, fails to capture the richness of cultural differences (Licht et al, 2004). Siegel et al. 
(2006) are the first to apply a theoretical framework from social psychology that explains 
what beliefs constitute a culture to economic outcomes like foreign trade and foreign direct 
investments. 
 
In this study we seek to make the following contributions to the study of culture, and the 
effect of formal institutions on managerial practices. This study is the first to apply a 
theoretical framework about culture to explain managerial misbehaviour and link specific 
cultural dimensions of a society to explain differences in earnings discretion. To 
operationalize nations’ cultural profiles, we draw from the theoretical frameworks from 
both Hofstede (1980) and Schwartz (1994, 1999, 2004). We link earnings discretion with 
cultural values Individualism definded by Hofstede (1980) as well as Egalitarism defined 
by Schwartz (1994, 1999, 2004).  
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Here, we will briefly explain why Individualism and egalitarianism are relevant for 
managerial behaviour. Individualism reflects the emotional independence of the person with 
respect to groups and organizations, while its absence would be similar to an emotional 
dependence and a feeling of “us” (Hofstede, 1980). Individualism is inversely related to the 
power distance dimension, which is -.64 in Hofstede’s original study, and -.70 in the sample 
of teachers and -.75 in that of students used in Schwartz’s cross-cultural study (Schwartz, 
1994). Therefore, at least at a cultural level, individualism is the opposite of the acceptance of 
hierarchy and of social inequality. We hypothesize that greater individualism could lead to 
lower levels of earnings management since societies with high degree of individualism put 
emphasis on respecting individual (property) rights. Licht et al. (2004) found that 
individualist countries emphasize much more the enforcement of laws. We believe that 
individualism will not only be reflected in formal institutions but also in informal settings. 
 
Egalitarianism relates to a society’s intolerance for abuses of market and political power 
inequality. It is reflected in a society’s choices about how much to control market abuses by 
monopolists; about how much financial transparency to expect from large firms; and about 
how much to limit political corruption. Managers from egalitarian societies are less willing to 
tolerate the use of status or power as a substitute for information disclosure and evidence 
needed to calculate mutual gains. Egalitarianism has been found to correlate negatively with 
corruption (Siegel et al. 2006). Our argument is that differences in egalitarianism between 
countries influence the managerial behaviour in earnings discretion. 
 
We find evidence that individualism and egalitarianism are robust determinants of earnings 
discretion even after controlling for a wide-ranging set of competing explanations. The paper 
is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the earnings management literature and 
discusses how this study contributes to this literate. Section III articulates the theory for why 
individualism and egalitarianism exercise a significant impact on earnings discretion. Section 
IV reviews the data gathered on individualism and egalitarianism, earnings discretion, and 
other variables. Section V reports on how cultural values exercise a direct effect on earnings 
discretion even after controlling for a wide array of other influences. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Earnings management is the act of obfuscating financial reports made to external 
stakeholders. Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as the alteration of 
firms’ reported economic performance by insiders to either “mislead some stakeholders” or to 
 4
“influence contractual outcomes.” The disclosure of “true and fair” financial earnings is 
crucial to corporate governance because it provides outsiders with a basis to monitor their 
claims and exercise their rights (see, for example, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
1999). The incentives to misrepresent firm performance through earnings management arise 
from the conflict of interest between the firms’ insiders and outsiders. As Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) point out, insiders have an incentive to use the firm’s resources in a way that 
benefits them, but not outsiders (i.e. private control benefits). In the presence of extensive 
earnings management, financial reports inaccurately reflect firm performance and 
consequently weaken outsiders’ ability to govern the firm. Insiders' ability to acquire private 
control benefits is limited by an explicit institutional framework, through corporate 
governance mechanisms and the legal system in protecting the interests of outside minority 
shareholders (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000). 
 
The majority of studies on earnings management are performed at firm level, within one 
country. Typically, research (e.g. Peasnell et al., 2000; Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002; DeFond 
and Jiambalvo, 1991) investigates the relationship between corporate governance settings and 
earnings management. Recently, several studies have compared corporate governance settings 
and management practises across countries studies. Prior research suggests that greater legal 
protection of outside investors increases insiders’ costs of diverting firm profits or assets (e.g., 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2000; Claessens et al., 2000a; Nenova, 2000). Consistently, Leuz et 
al. (2002) find a significant negative relationship between outside minority protection and 
earnings management. Although there is some intuition that corporate governance reflects 
national culture (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999), cultural values have rarely been used as 
explanatory variables in accounting research. This study is the first to investigate how culture 
affects earnings management behaviour. 
 
 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Culture refers to the complex of meanings, symbols, and assumptions about what is good or 
bad, legitimate or illegitimate that underlie the prevailing practices and norms in a society 
(Bourdieu, 1977). Value emphases are the essence of culture seen this way. They are the 
implicitly or explicitly shared, abstract ideas about what is good, right, and desirable in a 
society (Williams, 1970). They justify and guide the ways that social institutions (e.g., the 
family, education, economic, political, religious systems) function, their goals and modes of 
operation. Social actors (e.g., organizational leaders, policy-makers, firm managers) draw on 
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these cultural value emphases to select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain or 
justify their actions and evaluations.  
 
III.A. Informal social Institutions 
Institutions are widely understood to be the “humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction” (see North, 1990). They are composed of formal rules, informal 
constraints, and the enforcement characteristics of both. If institutions are understood to be 
“the rules of the game,” then informal institutions are the unwritten, unspoken rules of the 
game, the collection of beliefs, values, and social norms that constrain the behaviour of 
individuals and organizations often lumped together as “culture.”  
 
In one view informal institutions are simply treated as exogenous factors – they are “taken as 
given by most institutional economists” (Williamson, 2000). Alternatively, informal 
institutions are modelled as endogenously-appearing self-enforcing rules that are the 
equilibrium of a repeated game (Aoki 2001). The latter view considers the content of such 
institutions to be common knowledge (Greif and Laitin 2004). Sociology and psychology 
view a society’s prevailing values and norms as motivators of and justification for action (Nee 
2005). The cognitive (knowing) element of values is augmented, at the individual level, by an 
affective (feeling) element that influences motivations and guides actions (Schwartz and 
Bilsky 1987). Behaviour that is consistent with values engenders a positive feeling and vice 
versa. At the societal level, psychologists view value preferences as an interconnected system, 
a “social mind” (e.g., Hofstede, 2001) and Oyserman, 2002), much in line with the economic 
conception of societal common knowledge.  
 
Consistent with the view of informal institutions as societal equilibria, recent work has found 
cultural orientations to be relatively stable and to exert their influence over long periods of 
time (e.g., Guiso et al., 2005a and b and Tabellini, 2005). Psychologists tend to agree that, 
once adopted; value preferences remain relatively fixed over time (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; 
Schwartz, 1992; and Oyserman, 2002). The upshot is that societies’ informal institutions 
affect a vast array of factors that evolve as a system in which specific components are 
compatible with one another. The resulting institutions “have a lasting grip on the way a 
society conducts itself” (Williamson, 2000). 
 
III.B. Comparing Cultures  
The inclination to treat informal institutions as black boxes is responsible for the paucity of 
analyses of their content and structure. Theoretical models of the content of cultural 
orientations are few and incomplete (Siegel et al., 2006). Many studies account for culture by 
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focusing exclusively on the dominant religion or percentage of followers of each religion 
(e.g., La Porta et al., 1999). Dominant religion is a valid proxy for culture because religions 
are a primary source of moral injunctions and beliefs. But the approach nevertheless fails to 
capture the richness of cultural differences (Licht et al, 2004). 
 
Both Hofstede (1980) and Schwartz (1994) attempted to identify national cultural dimensions 
that could be used to compare cultures. Hofstede derived his framework empirically, while 
Schwartz developed his framework theoretically. Both scholars have empirically examined 
their frameworks using large-scale multi-country samples. They found greater cultural 
differences between countries than within countries, suggesting the frameworks could be used 
to compare countries. Hofstede's (1980) original research focused on IBM employees in 72 
nations and two period of time (1967-1969 and 1971-1973). Schwartz's (1992, 1994) original 
research focused on teacher and student samples in 38 nations that included 41 cultural 
groups, collected between 1988 and 1992. 
 
Hofstede (1980) collected responses to 32 values statements from more than 117,000 IBM 
employees in 40 nations between 1967 and 1969. The following four cultural dimensions 
were derived from this data (Hofstede, 1983) and remain at the heart of much cultural 
research: Individualism, Power distance, Uncertainty avoidance and Masculinity. Only two 
dimensions exhibit a clear relationship with managerial behaviour. Individualism is inversely 
related to the power distance dimension (-0.64) and most studies have focused on 
individualism to explain the importance of cultural differences. In addition, Vandello and 
Cohen (1999) concur that "one of the most useful and actively researched constructs to 
emerge from cultural social psychology has been the dimension of individualism". Therefore, 
we focus on the relationship between individualism and managerial misbehaviour. 
 
Although Hofstede’s dimensions for assessing cultural distance are extensively used in the 
literature, several researchers (McSweeney, 2002; Shenkar, 2001; Smith et al., 2002) have 
criticized Hofstede's dimensions as being derived from old data, lacking generalisability and 
being too condensed to capture culture. In their review of culture and international business 
scholarship, Leung et al. (2005) call for implementing more recent models of cultural 
dimensions. Previous research suggests that Schwartz's cultural values capture more aspects 
of culture than those of Hofstede's (Kagitcibasi, 1997; Schwartz and Ros, 1995; Steenkamp, 
2001). 
 
However, it would be hasty to dismiss the use of Hofstede’s cultural scores as they have been 
found to be useful in many instances. Hofstede (2001) noted 140 non-IBM data studies that 
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validated his cultural indexes. For example, Best and Williams (1998) found that an 
“individualistic” psychological trait correlated significantly with Hofstede's individualism 
index (0.41), while Van Oudenhoven (2001) found that company bureaucracy correlated 
significantly with power distance index (0.66) and uncertainty avoidance index (0.63). Thus, 
it may be that there are specific contexts in which cultural distance scores based on Hofstede's 
dimensions are appropriate and other contexts in which other forms of cultural distance may 
be more appropriate. We therefore consider cultural values from both Hofstede (1980) and 
Schwartz (1994, 1999, 2004). 
 
To operationalize nations’ cultural profiles, Schwartz analyzes differences in how national 
populations prioritize 45 universally recognized values. Schwartz’s model is currently 
considered the most advanced in social psychology for a number of reasons. First, the model 
is theory-driven, its central elements having been derived from earlier work in the social 
sciences. Second, and most important, the model uses value measures shown to have cross-
culturally equivalent meanings at the individual level to operationalize the cultural 
dimensions. Finally, validating data for this model was collected relatively recently (see 
Smith, Bond, and Kagitcibasi (2006), Brett and Okumura (1998), and Mezias et al. (2002)). 
Schwartz (1994, 1999, 2004) identifies three key issues societies must address and derives 
three corresponding dimensions for cross-cultural analysis: Egalitarism versus hierarchy, 
Embededness versus autonomy and Mastery versus harmony. The social psychological 
framework enables us to be specific about which factors might be critical for deterring 
earnings manipulation. Only one of the latter, egalitarianism vs. hierarchy, exhibits a clear 
connection with earnings manipulation.  
 
As part of a series of robustness checks, we test and control for the other cultural dimensions 
and find that individualism and egalitarianism are both the theoretically relevant and 
statistically robust predictor of earnings manipulation.  
 
III.C. Individualism and Earnings Management 
Individualism is the one side versus its opposite, collectivism, that is the degree to which 
individuals are integrated into groups. On the individualist side we find societies in which the 
ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her 
immediate family. On the collectivist side, we find societies in which people from birth 
onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families which 
continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 
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Individualistic cultures have favourable responses to items such as: “Have a job which leaves 
you sufficient time for your personal or family life”, “Have considerable freedom to adapt 
your own approach to the job”, and “Have challenging work to do – work from which you 
can get a personal sense of accomplishment.” A country with a high score in collectivism 
gives more importance to factors such as: “Have training opportunities (to improve your skills 
or learn new skills)” and “Have good physical working conditions (good ventilation and 
lighting, adequate work space, etc.).” In other words, they value more what the organization 
can do for the individual. 
 
According to Hofstede (1980), individualism reflects the emotional independence of the 
person with respect to groups and organizations, while its absence would be similar to an 
emotional dependence and a feeling of “us”. Individualism is inversely related to the power 
distance dimension, which is -.64 in Hofstede’s original study, and -.70 in the sample of 
teachers and -.75 in that of students used in Schwartz’s cross-cultural study (Schwartz, 1994). 
Therefore, at least at a cultural level, individualism is the opposite of the acceptance of 
hierarchy and of social inequality. 
 
By identifying related theories and constructs, Waterman (1984) put the definition of 
individualism into a larger psychological context. He found individualism to share four 
features: (i) being true to one’s self; (ii) freedom of choice within the constraints of the like 
freedom of others; (iii) personal responsibility which accompanies a sense of being a causally 
effective agent; and (iv) universality, which involves respect for the integrity of others. 
 
In individualistic cultures, where individual rights are paramount, equitable administration of 
justice becomes a central ethical theme. Because the individual is motivated by his personal 
goals and interests in individualistic cultures, cooperation and conspiracy, which are often 
necessary for widespread corruption, can be more difficult in individualistic cultures than in 
collective cultures. In addition, Licht et al. (2004) argue that societies high on individualism 
may be less susceptible to corruption because corruption signals disrespect for individual 
persons’ property and independent discretion. Furthermore, Hofstede (2001) and Davis and 
Ruhe (2003) find a negative relationship between individualism and corruption. 
 
In addition, Licht et al. (2004) present evidence on relations between statutory law and 
culture, in the context of corporate governance. They demonstrate that corporate governance 
laws relate systematically to the prevailing culture. They find that investor legal rights are 
stronger in nations high on the Hofstede Individualism dimension. These findings support the 
notion that laws on the books reflect similar cultural orientations.  
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 We hypothesize that greater individualism could lead to lower levels of earnings management 
since societies with high degree of individualism put emphasis on respecting individual rights. 
Managers from individualist societies may be more aware of the consequences of 
disrespecting individual property rights of the shareholders. Licht et al. (2004) found that 
individualist countries emphasize much more the enforcement of laws. We believe that 
individualism will not only be reflected in formal institutions but also in informal settings:  
 
H1: Countries with higher levels of individualism have lower levels of earnings management. 
 
III.D Egalitarism and Earnings management 
Egalitarianism is “the belief that all people are of equal worth and should be treated equally in 
society” (Schwartz, 2001). Egalitarianism also stands for the corresponding cultural 
orientation in the Schwartz model. Societal stances on this issue vary along a continuum 
between the two polar positions of egalitarianism versus hierarchy. Such stances are the 
institutional responses every society must develop to address the key challenge of eliciting 
cooperative, productive activity in society. Important values in egalitarian cultures include 
equality, social justice, responsibility, helpfulness, and honesty. In other words, highly 
egalitarian societies are ones whose citizens say that these and other compatible values do 
relatively more to guide their everyday conduct than values reflecting cultural hierarchy such 
as social power, authority, and wealth.  
 
Egalitarianism matters because it influences policymaking at the macro level and everyday 
business conduct at the individual manager level. This business conduct includes a company’s 
belief in the need for revealing sensitive information about its financial condition, a 
company’s decision not to exploit its monopoly position in an anti-competitive fashion, a 
company’s practices of dealing with workers, including the provision of job protection and 
employment benefits, and a company’s decision not to engage in corrupt political activity. At 
the macro level, egalitarianism influences legislators, executive officials, prosecutors, and 
regulators who enact and enforce laws dealing with antitrust, labour protections, financial 
transparency, and anti-corruption. 
 
Siegel et al. (2006) show that societal stances that emphasize egalitarianism are reflected 
primarily in a society’s lack of tolerance for abuses of power, whether market or political, but 
also in a wide range of social and economic policy choices including distributions and 
regulations that protect the indigent, the unemployed, the retired, and the elderly. Cultural 
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preference for hierarchy, in contrast, legitimizes unequal distribution of power, roles, and 
resources on the basis of attributes such as wealth, gender, age, and caste. Using all three 
widely known indices for freedom from corruption Siegel et al. (2006), find that 
egalitarianism is highly correlated with freedom from corruption even after controlling for 
income inequality, religious composition, legal origin, federalism, natural resource 
abundance, and constructed trade openness. We hypothesize that greater egalitarianism could 
lead to lower levels of earnings management: 
 
H2: Countries with higher levels of egalitarianism have lower levels of earnings 
management. 
 
IV. DATA SPECIFICATION 
 
IV.A. Dependent Variables: Earnings Discretion 
Leuz et al. (2002) compute two measures for earnings smoothing and two measures for 
earnings discretion from 70,955 firm-year observations for fiscal years 1990-99 across 31 
countries and 8,616 non-financial firms. They propose an aggregate measure of earnings 
management based on two measures of earnings smoothing and two measures of earnings 
discretion. Since earnings discretion is a stronger indicator of earnings manipulation we 
choose to test our hypotheses against earnings discretion rather than earnings smoothing or an 
aggregate measure. As part of a series of robustness checks, we repeat our analysis for the 
aggregate measure of all four variables and find consistent results. 
 
Managers may use their reporting discretion to misstate the firm’s actual economic 
performance. For instance, they can manage earnings to report extraordinary performance in 
specific instances such as an equity issuance. As the accounting component of earnings (i.e. 
accruals) inherently involves judgment on the part of managers, the magnitude of accruals can 
be used as a proxy for the amount of discretion insiders use to influence disclosed firm 
performance. Scaling the variable by the absolute value of the firm’s cash flow from 
operations controls for firm performance. The first measure for earnings discretion is 
calculated as the country’s median ratio of the absolute value of accruals and the absolute 
value of the cash flow from operations. Extreme observations of this measure are indicative of 
large-scale use of discretion to manipulate reported accounting earnings. This earnings 
management measure is calculated at the country level as the median ratio of the absolute 
value of accruals to the absolute value of the operating cash flow. 
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The second measure is the number of “small profits” divided by the number of “small losses” 
for each country. DeGeorge et al. (1999) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) present evidence 
that managers of US firms use accounting discretion to avoid reporting small losses. While it 
may be argued that managers have incentive to avoid losses of any size, they have limited 
reporting discretion and hence are unable to report profits in the presence of large losses. 
Small losses, however, are more likely to lie within the bounds of insiders’ reporting 
discretion and consequently can be avoided through earnings management. Thus, for each 
country, the incidence of small profits compared to the incidence of small losses measures the 
extent to which firm insiders exercise discretion to avoid reporting losses. A higher ratio 
indicates greater loss avoidance activity and earnings management. A firm-year observation is 
classified as a “small profit” if net earnings (scaled by lagged total assets) are in the range 
(0,0.01). A firm-year observation is classified as a “small loss” if net earnings (scaled by 
lagged total assets) are in the range (-0.01,0). Net earnings are bottom-line reported income 
after interest, taxes, special items, extraordinary items, reserves and any other items included 
in bottom-line net income. 
 
IV.B. Culture 
Hofstede (1980) collected responses to 32 values statements from more than 117,000 IBM 
employees across the world around 1968 and around 1972. Factor analysis of country mean 
scores in 50 countries and three regions produced four dimensions: Individualism, Power 
distance, Uncertainty avoidance and Masculinity. Hofstede argued against the criticism that 
that “IBMers are not at all representative for our country”, that the crucial requirement is that 
samples be well matched across countries, not that they be representative. He asserted that 
comparing IBM subsidiaries shows national culture differences with unusual clarity because 
the samples are so homogeneous in terms of employer, kind of work, and education level. 
 
Schwartz analyzes differences in how national populations prioritize 45 value items that have 
equivalent meaning across cultures 45 using a large-scale value survey of over 15,000 urban 
teachers who teach the full range of subjects in grades 3-12 in the most common type of 
school system in countries on every inhabited continent. We utilize the 2005 release of the 
data set for the 55 countries surveyed during the years 1988-2004. The mean importance of a 
particular cultural orientation in a country was computed as the average of the importance 
individual respondents attributed to the set of value items that represent the orientation. For 
cross-national comparisons, sample differences in scale use were eliminated by centering the 
importance ratings of all cultural orientations within each sample around their mean. Focusing 
on teachers allows samples to be matched on critical characteristics (e.g., distributions of age, 
education, and occupation) largely from the dominant cultural group in each nation. The 
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robustness of national cultural profiles obtained from the teacher sample was separately 
confirmed with data separately obtained from samples of undergraduate students in most of 
these same countries. While the Schwartz survey has yet to be directly conducted on a pure 
sample of managers, the egalitarianism variable itself is positively correlated to various 
corruption indices. Treisman (2000) found that samples of the business community and 
samples of the general population were highly correlated in their views towards corruption. 
 
IV.C. Control variables 
Recent corporate governance research suggests that the legal protection of outside investors is 
a key determinant of financial market development, capital and ownership structures, 
dividend policies, and private control benefits around the world (for surveys see Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997 and La Porta et al, 2000). La Porta et al. (2000) later advanced the “legal 
approach”—namely, classifying legal regimes by a country’s legal origin affiliation—as the 
preferred way to understand corporate governance. We control for of legal tradition since 
legal tradition has been shown to be a powerful predictor of financial development. Leuz et al. 
(2002) present a cluster analysis using nine institutional variables used in La Porta et al. (1997 
and 1998). The groups they obtain are very similar to the simple code-law and common-law 
categorizations. 
 
Ownership structure is both related with the incentives for management to manipulate 
earnings as with the internal corporate governance setting. Loebbecke et al. (1989) report that 
charges of fraudulent reporting are more frequent against closely held firms. We measure 
ownership concentration as the median percentage of common shares owned by the largest 
three shareholders in the 10 largest privately owned non-financial firms (La Porta et al., 
1998). 
 
As additional control variables, we consider a range of economic and institutional variables. 
In prior work, per-capita GDP is an overwhelmingly influential variable in explaining the 
differences in observed financing, ownership and payout policies around the world. We also 
control for the importance of the capital market since it may influence the behaviour of the 
manager. Studies found indicate that firms report positive unexpected accruals prior to 
seasoned equity offers and initial public offers (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998 and Teoh, 
Wong, and Rao, 1998), and stock-financed acquisitions (Erickson and Wang (1998)). Other 
studies of earnings management for capital market reasons have shown that earnings are 
managed to meet the expectations of financial analysts or management (e.g. Payne et al., 1997 
and Burgstahler and Eames, 1998). The “importance of the equity markets” is measured by 
the mean rank across three variables used in La Porta et al. (1997): (1) the ratio of the 
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aggregate stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross national product, (2) the 
number of listed domestic firms relative to the population, and (3) the number of IPOs 
relative to the population. Each variable is ranked such that higher scores indicate a greater 
importance of the stock market. To account for formal institutions, Leuz et al. (2002) consider 
outside investor rights and legal enforcement and find that both are important to explain 
earnings management. The outside investor rights variable is the “anti-director rights” index 
created by La Porta et al. (1998). It is an aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights 
and ranges from zero to six. Legal enforcement is measured as the mean score across three 
legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998): (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) an 
assessment of rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. All three variables range from zero to 
ten. 
 
We also run robustness checks in which we test for the potential importance of other 
cultural dimensions. For those robustness checks, we add the Uncertainty avoidance, 
power distance and masculinity for the analysis on the relationship between individualism 
and earnings discretion and we add harmony and embeddedness to check the robustness 
of the relationship between egalitarianism and earnings discretion. We show that our 
results for individualism and egalitarianism are robust to inclusion of the other culture 
factors. 
 
V. RESULTS 
V.A. Descriptive analysis 
We first describe the variables of interest we consider, which are presented in table 4. We 
consider data from 31 different countries, 39% of which have a common-law tradition and 
61% a code-law tradition. It is interesting to see that, as defined in EM discretion 2, the 
average number of “small profits” is three times the number of “small losses”. The data also 
reflects that the average firm in the average country has an ownership concentration of 41%  
 
------------------- Insert table 4 about here ------------------- 
 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for the considered variables. We observe a high 
correlation between the two cultural variables and legal enforcement. Societies where 
individualism and egalitarianism is high tend to have high legal enforcement. The more 
important personal values are, the more important it will be to provide protection. On the 
other hand, only individualism is correlated with ownership concentration. In addition, we 
observe that outside investor protection is highly correlated with ownership concentration, 
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capital market importance, and legal tradition. Countries with better minority shareholders 
rights, typically common-law countries, have more dispersed ownership and more developed 
capital markets. 
 
------------------- Insert table 5 about here ------------------- 
 
In order to motivate some of our findings of section V.B we present here the results of a 
exploratory analysis of the main variables that we are studying in this paper. It is important to 
remember that the main point we want to make with our work relies on the inclusion of 
cultural variables in the explanation of Earning Management (EM) behaviour under a set of 
given controls.  
 
Our first step in the analysis consists in performing a mean-based partition cluster analysis of 
the two cultural variables we are considering (Individualism and Egalitarianism). With this 
partition we obtain two sets of countries distinguished by their cultural characteristics. In 
graph 1 we plot the countries in our sample against Individualism and Egalitarianism in order 
to visualize the different grouping-patterns that we have generated with the cluster analysis. 
The point labels show the name of the country followed by the associated cluster number.  In 
cluster 2 we basically have Asian countries with the inclusion of Greece, Portugal and Spain, 
this last one very close to the border-line with cluster 1. In cluster 1 we find European 
countries jointly with USA, Canada and Australia.  
 
------------------- Insert graph 1 about here ------------------- 
 
On the one hand, cluster 1 is collecting highly individualist countries with an elevated 
recognition of the equality of treatment. On the other hand, cluster 2 represents countries with 
opposite characteristics (low levels of Individualism and Egalitarianism). It is worthy to 
notice how clear the grouping pattern is between both groups of countries with the apparent 
exemption of Greece, Portugal and Spain. Even so, the location of these three countries into 
the graph is not so surprising. Leuz et al. (2002) cluster for institutional setting and find 
similar results with respect to Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
 
The next step consists in the study of the EM measures associated to the two groups of 
countries we have found in the analysis of the cultural dimensions. For this purpose we 
perform a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of the two Earning Discretion variables in 
order to resume them in a single component. In table 6 we present some descriptive statistics 
for the earnings discretion variable discriminated by the two groups of countries we have 
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found before. We also perform a test1 of means for the two groups of countries. As it can be 
seen the test rejects the null hypothesis of equal means at the 1% level of confidence. This 
provides evidence that the cultural groups we have found are also implying some significant 
difference in the behaviour of the earnings discretion variable. 
 
------------------- Insert table 6 about here ------------------- 
 
Finally, in order to visualize the degree of correspondence between the cultural groups and 
EM behaviour we perform a mean-based cluster analysis of the earnings discretion 
component generating again two sets of countries with different EM characteristics. We find 
that the correspondence between the cultural clusters and the EM clusters is quite high, with 
21 countries out of 27 associated to same groups. In graph 2 we plot again the countries 
against the two cultural variables but now we add the number of cluster accordingly to the 
earnings discretion partition. As it can be observed, the cultural partition is misleading in the 
cases of Malaysia and Philippines on one hand, and Austria, Germany, Italy and Switzerland 
on the other. These last four countries present relative high level of EM in comparison with 
other countries in the same cultural group, and the opposite is true for Malaysia and 
Philippines. Finally, the EM partition is successful in the classification of the problematic 
countries we have commented before (Greece, Portugal, Spain).  
 
------------------- Insert graph 2 about here ------------------- 
 
V.B. The role of investor protection: Multiple regression analysis 
We next consider the multivariate regressions. Since we have substantial amount of 
correlation between the independent variables, we propose to start from a initial model 
capturing formal institutions and internal organization of the firm. Formal institutions reflect 
the institutional pressure to behave appropriately and have been shown to be link with 
earnings management. We initially proxy for institutional settings by legal tradition, 
afterwards we also consider legal enforcement and outside investor protection. Ownership 
concentration proxies for the internal corporate governance structure of the firm. We first 
estimate earnings management against legal tradition and ownership structure. Next, we 
include the cultural variables of interest (Individualism and Egalitarianism). Finally, we also 
test for the robustness of our results by including other control variables used previously in 
                                                 
1 We previously run an Anova analysis and we found a significant difference in variances, therefore we 
perform a mean test with unequal variances. 
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literature. For each of the models presented, we show that the inclusion of the cultural 
variable is justified statistically. 
 
From Model 1 in Table 7, we observe that ownership concentration and legal tradition explain 
a large proportion of the variance in earnings discretion. Managers from countries with a high 
ownership concentration and civil-law tend to misbehave more. Table 9 considers the 
relationship between individualism and earnings discretion, while the relationship between 
egalitarianism and earnings discretion is presented in table 10. In Model 2, we include the 
Hofstede cultural value Individualism to the initial model. We find that individualism is 
highly significant and negative related with earnings discretion. This result is in line with our 
hypothesis. We also see a significant increase in the variance explained by the model from 
47% to 58%. 
 
Model 3 to 6 in Table 7 we add several economic and institutional variables to demonstrate 
the robustness of the relationship between individualism and earnings discretion. Model 3, 
Model 4 and Model 5 introduce GDP per-capita, Capital Market Importance, and Legal 
Enforcement respectively, none of which are significant. However, we confirm that 
Individualism is still highly significant; the variance explained by the model is still above 
56%. Finally, in Model 6 we include Outside Investor Protection as a control variable instead 
of Legal Tradition. Outside investor protection correlates highly with legal tradition. The 
results are consistent and always in line with hypothesis one. 
 
------------------- Insert table 7 about here ------------------- 
 
In order to test our second hypothesis we use the same methodology. The results are 
presented in Table 8. We start with the same initial model, only now for 27 observations 
instead of 31. For Belgium, Pakistan, South Africa and Thailand we were unable to obtain the 
Schwartz value. Similar to model 1 of table 7, we find that legal tradition and ownership 
concentration explain a substantial amount of variance of the dependent variable. Model 8 
includes Egalitarianism in the specification. We find that egalitarianism is negative related 
with earnings discretion. This is line with our hypothesis, since egalitarianism relates to a 
broad set of conceptually compatible policy choices that concern tolerance for abuses of 
market and political power. Our results are also in line with prior research finding that 
egalitarianism correlates positively with lower corruption and greater transparency in 
financial markets (Siegel et al., 2006). 
 
------------------- Insert table 8 about here ------------------- 
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 In addition, this model outperforms the initial model 7 as the explained variances jumps from 
53% to 62%. The Models 9 to 12 check for sensitivity analyses incorporating new control 
variables as previously. Our results are consistent for all specifications. 
 
------------------- Insert table 9 about here ------------------- 
 
We also run robustness checks in which we test for the potential importance of other 
cultural dimensions. For those robustness checks, we add uncertainty avoidance, power 
distance and masculinity for the analysis on the relationship between individualism and 
earnings discretion and we add harmony and embeddedness to check the robustness of the 
relationship between egalitarianism and earnings discretion. The results are presented in 
table 9. Model 13, 14 and 15 include uncertainty avoidance, power distance and 
masculinity respectively. In all models Individualism and legal tradition are always negative 
and Ownership Concentration is always positive and highly significant. From the new added 
variables, only Masculinity is significant and positively related with EM Discretion; however, 
when we include it in a specification with the other four Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, only 
Individualism remains significant. 
 
For the case of Schwartz’s cultural dimensions, we proceeded in the same way. Models 17 
and 18 include the variables embeddednes and Harmony respectively, besides Egalitarianism. 
Model 19 include the three variables together. We observe that the relationship between 
individualism and earnings discretion is significant and very stable. The results for Harmony 
are not consistent and although we find a significant negative relationship between 
embeddedness in models 17 and 19, the relationship is not robust. If we run model 17 without 
egalitarianism we find no significant relationship between embeddedness and earnings 
discretion. This robustness analysis confirms that the results obtained previously relating 
Individualism and Egalitarianism are not only in line with our hypothesis but also are 
consistent to different model specifications. 
 
In summary, our empirical findings show that while a number of institutional factors appear 
to be correlated with earnings management activities around the world, the cultural values 
Individualism and Egalitarianism are robust determinants of earnings discretion. While we do 
not rule out the complementary role of the formal institutional variables, specific informal 
institutional variables (individualism and egalitarism) seem to be a key primitive that drives 
differences in earnings management across countries. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
The disclosure of “true and fair” financial earnings is crucial to corporate governance because 
it provides outsiders with a basis to monitor their claims and exercise their rights (see, for 
example, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 1999). Using theory and empirical data 
from social psychology to measure for cultural differences between countries, we hypothesize 
a that earnings management is lower in cultures with high levels of individualism and high 
levels of egalitarianism. 
 
We test this hypothesis using financial accounting data for companies from 31 countries. We 
first perform a descriptive cluster analysis between the two cultural values and the measures 
of earnings discretion. The cluster analysis indicates that countries with low levels of 
individualism and low levels of egalitarianism have significantly higher levels of earnings 
discretion.  
 
We undertake a multiple regression analysis to further quantify the impact of cultural values 
on firms’ earnings management practices. The regression results show that earnings 
management is negatively associated with individualism and egalitarianism after controlling 
for other important factors such as ownership concentration, legal tradition, GDP per capita, 
outside investor protection, legal enforcement and capital market importance. The results 
complement the findings of Leuz et al. (2002) who finds that earnings management tend to be 
higher when legal protection is low. Our empirical findings point to an important link 
between informal institutions and the quality of financial information provided to market 
participants around the world.  
 
Our results show that besides formal institutions it is relevant to consider cultural differences 
to explain earnings management behaviour. For policy making it may be important to 
consider the interaction between informal institutions and formal institutions.  
 
When interpreting our results, one should bear in mind a least two limitations: First, we work 
with a limited number of observations. This is however a common limitation for cross-
country studies. Furthermore, our analysis is using proxies to measure earnings management, 
cultural dimensions and institutional settings. However, we try to reduce the risk of having 
inadequate proxies by using only variables used in high-quality published papers. 
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Table 1 
The Hofstede Cultural Value Dimensions 
Variable Description 
Individualism 
A preference for a loosely knit social framework in which 
individuals take care of themselves and their immediate 
families. Collectivism is the alternative and is a preference for a 
tightly knit social framework in which individuals expect 
relatives, clan, or other in-group to look after them, in exchange 
for loyalty. Hofstede, G. (1980) 
Uncertainty Avoidance The extent to which people feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. Hofstede, G. (1980) 
Power Distance Index The extent to which people accept that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally. Hofstede, G. (1980) 
Masculinity 
A preference for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and 
material success rather than femininity, which is 
a preference for relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and 
quality of life. Hofstede, G. (1980) 
 
 
Table 2 
The Schwartz Cultural Value Dimensions 
Variable Description 
Egalitarianism/Hierarchy 
Concerns guaranteeing responsible behavior that will preserve 
the social fabric. Hierarchy refers to a cultural emphasis on 
obeying role obligations within a legitimately unequal 
distribution of power, roles, and resources. Egalitarianism 
refers to an emphasis on transcendence of selfish interests in 
favor of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of 
others. Schwartz, S H, (1992) 
Embeddedness/Autonomy 
Concerns the desirable relationship between the individual and 
the group. Embeddedness represents a cultural emphasis on 
maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and restraint of 
actions or inclinations that might disrupt group solidarity or the 
traditional order. Autonomy describes cultures in which the 
person is viewed as an autonomous, bounded entity who finds 
meaning in his or her own uniqueness. Intellectual Autonomy 
refers to a cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals 
independently pursuing their own ideas and intellectual 
directions; Affective Autonomy to a cultural emphasis on the 
desirability of individuals independently pursuing affectively 
positive experience. Schwartz, S H, (1992) 
Mastery/Harmony 
Concerns the relation of humankind to the natural and social 
world. Mastery refers to a cultural emphasis on getting ahead 
through active self-assertion. Harmony refers to an emphasis on 
fitting harmoniously into the social and natural environment. 
Schwartz, S H, (1992) 
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Table 3 
Variables Description 
Variable Description 
EM_Disc 
Is the principal component score for earnings discretion. This 
variable was constructed using principal components analysis of 
two earnings discretion proxies (1) the country’s median ratio of 
the absolute value of accruals and the absolute value of the cash 
flow from operations, and (2) the number of “small profits” 
divided by the number of “small losses” for each country. A 
firm-year observation is classified as a “small profit” if net 
earnings (scaled by lagged total assets) are in the range (0,0.01). 
A firm-year observation is classified as a “small loss” if net 
earnings (scaled by lagged total assets) are in the range (-
0.01,0). Net earnings are bottom-line reported income after 
interest, taxes, special items, extraordinary items, reserves and 
any other items included in bottom-line net income. Leuz, C, 
(2002). 
Ownership 
Concentration 
 
Ownership concentration is measured as the median percentage 
of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in 
the 10 largest privately owned non-financial firms (La Porta et 
al., 1998). 
Legal Tradition 
 
Legal tradition is based on La Porta et al. (1998). Dummy 
variable taking a value of 1 if the country has a common-law 
tradition and zero if the country has a code-law tradition. 
GDP Per Capita Averaged per-capita GDP, in constant 1995 US dollars, from 1990 to 1999. 
Capital Market 
Importance 
Capital market importance is measured by the mean rank across 
three variables used in La Porta et al. (1997): (1) the ratio of the 
aggregate stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross 
national product, (2) the number of listed domestic firms 
relative to the population, and (3) the number of IPOs relative to 
the population. Each variable is ranked such that higher scores 
indicate a greater importance of the stock market. 
Legal Enforcement 
 
Legal enforcement is measured as the mean score across three 
legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998): (1) the efficiency 
of the judicial system, (2) an assessment of rule of law, and (3) 
the corruption index. All three variables range from zero to 10 
Outside Investor 
Protection 
 
The outside investor protection variable is the “anti-director 
rights” index created by La Porta et al. (1998). It is an aggregate 
measure of minority shareholder rights and ranges from zero to 
six. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median St dev Min Max 
EM discretion 1 0.56 0.55 0.13 0.30 0.85 
EM discretion 2 3.20 3.00 1.41 1.24 7.20 
Individualism 53.13 63.00 25.60 14.00 91.00 
Uncertainty Avoidance 58.48 53.00 24.90 8.00 112.00 
Egalitarianism 4.89 4.98 0.31 4.33 5.39 
Ownership Concentration 0.41 0.43 0.16 0.12 0.68 
Capital Market Importance 15.63 14.30 7.32 4.70 28.80 
Legal Tradition 0.39 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Outside Investor Protection 3.19 3.00 1.40 0.00 5.00 
Legal Enforcement 7.93 8.90 2.12 2.90 10.00 
 
 
Table 5 
Correlation matrix 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 EM_Disc -0.48** -0.11 0.54** -0.49** -0.52** -0.6** -0.28**
2 Individualism  0.6** -0.34* 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.69**
3 Egalitarianism  0.15 -0.12 -0.26 -0.26 0.48**
4 Ownership Concentration  -0.31* -0.11 -0.4** -0.36*
5 Cap. Market Importance  0.56** 0.49** 0.55**
6 Legal Tradition  0.71** -0.09
7 Out. Investor Protection   -0.01
8 Legal Enforcement   
Significance level of 0.10: *; Significance level of 0.05: ** 
 
 
Table 6 
Two-Sample “t” test with unequal variances 
Group Obs Mean Std Error Std Dev 
1 15 -0.422 0.303 1.172 
2 12 0.635 0.185 0.640 
Combined 27 0.048 0.211 1.095 
Difference  -1.057** 0.355  
Significance level of 0.10: *; Significance level of 0.05: ** 
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Table 7 
OLS Regression results for Earnings Discretion against Individualism 
Dependent Variable: 
EM_Disc 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
(Constant) -0.85** (0.38) 
-0.22 
(0.51) 
0.05 
(0.52) 
-0.31 
(0.59) 
-0.18 
(0.71) 
-1.58** 
(0.69) 
Individualism - -0.014** (0.005) 
-0.018** 
(0.006) 
-0.014** 
(0.005) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.016** 
(0.005) 
Ownership 
concentration 
2.99** 
(0.82) 
2.24** 
(0.78) 
2.37** 
0.78) 
2.18** 
(0.82) 
2.35** 
(0.79) 
1.18 
(0.86) 
Legal tradition -0.94** (0.27) 
-0.96** 
(0.24) 
-0.82* 
(0.27) 
-0.91** 
(0.30) 
-0.94** 
(0.25) - 
GDP per Capita - - -0.0002 (0.000) - - - 
Capital market 
importance - - - 
0.007 
(0.02) - - 
Legal enforcement - - - - -0.054 (0.08) - 
Outside investor 
protection - - - - - 
-0.37** 
(0.09) 
N° Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Adjusted R Square 0.468 0.576 0.583 0.561 0.567 0.576 
F 14.20 14.58 11.46 10.59 10.83 14.58 
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Significance level of 0.10: *; Significance level of 0.05: ** 
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Table 8 
OLS Regression results for Earnings Discretion against Egalitarianism  
Dependent Variable: 
EM_Disc 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
(Constant) -0.97** (0.36) 
-4.08** 
(1.95) 
4.39** 
(2.11) 
4.20** 
(1.96) 
4.33* 
(2.13) 
4.51* 
(2.26) 
Egalitarianism  - -1.04** (0.39) 
-1.13** 
(0.46) 
-0.997** 
(0.40) 
-1.15** 
(0.53) 
-0.928** 
(0.43) 
Ownership 
concentration 
3.32** 
(0.80) 
3.54** 
(0.72) 
3.67** 
(0.80) 
3.35** 
(0.76) 
3.69** 
(0.88) 
2.97** 
(0.85) 
Legal tradition -0.84** (0.28) 
-1.01** 
(0.26) 
-1.00** 
(0.26) 
-0.80** 
(0.22) 
-1.04** 
(0.28) - 
GDP per Capita - - -0.0000 (0.000) - - - 
Capital market 
importance - - - 
-0.020 
(0.022) - - 
Legal enforcement - - - - -0.028 (0.09) - 
Outside investor 
protection - - - - - 
-0.338** 
(0.116) 
N° Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Adjusted R Square 0.529 0.622 0.608 0.619 0.607 0.538 
F 15.61 15.29 11.10 11.56 11.04 11.10 
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Significance level of 0.10: *; Significance level of 0.05: ** 
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Table 9 
OLS Regression results for Earnings Discretion against Cultural values 
Dependent 
Variable: 
EM_Disc 
Model 
13 
Model 
14 
Model 
15 
Model 
16 
Model 
17 
Model 
18 
Model 
19 
(Constant) -0.37 (0.82) 
-0.21 
(0.81) 
0.39 
(0.63) 
-0.28 
(0.79) 
11.88** 
(4.13) 
3.14 
(1.99) 
10.40** 
(4.22) 
Individualism -0.013** (0.005) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.015** 
(0.005) 
-0.015** 
(0.006) - - - 
Egalitarianism  - - - - -1.15** (0.53) 
-1.64** 
(0.55) 
-2.34** 
(0.63) 
Ownership 
concentration 
2.22** 
(0.78) 
2.24** 
(0.81) 
2.07** 
(0.75) 
2.11** 
(0.79) 
4.23** 
(0.75) 
3.26** 
(0.73) 
3.93** 
(0.77) 
Legal tradition -0.79** (0.28) 
-0.96** 
(0.25) 
-1.07** 
(0.24) 
-0.95** 
(0.31) 
-0.78** 
(0.26) 
-0.64* 
(0.35) 
-0.50 
(0.34) 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
0.007 
(0.006) - - 
0.004 
(0.006) - - - 
Power Distance - -0.001 (0.008) - 
-0.002 
(0.007) - - - 
Masculinity - - 0.011* (0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) - - - 
Embeddedness - - - - -1.05** (0.05) - 
-0.96* 
(0.48) 
Harmony - - - - - -0.91 (0.60) 
-0.75** 
(0.57) 
N° 
Observations 31 31 31 31 27 27 27 
Adjusted R 
Square 0.584 0.560 0.612 0.588 0.671 0.643 0.682 
F 11.51 10.53 12.84 8.13 14.27 12.71 12.15 
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Significance level of 0.10: *; Significance level of 0.05: ** 
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